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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH ALUNITE CORP. and the UTAH SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL 
TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KENT L. JONES, in his official capacity as the State Engineer, and CENTAL 
IRON COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs appeal from the Fifth District Court's order dismissing the suit. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, transferred from 
the Utah Supreme Court. Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)G) (West Supp. 
2014). 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Did the trial court correctly dismiss Plaintiffs' suit to review a State 
Engineer's administrative order for lack of standing because Plaintiffs did not 
participate in the related administrative proceeding? 
2 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court properly granted a motion 
to dismiss is a question of law, which appellate courts review for correctness. 
Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ,r 2, 20 P.3d 895. 
Preservation: R. 50, 54-57, 307-11. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Determinative to this Court's review is Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (West 
Supp 2014), which states at Subsection (l)(a): 
(1) (a) A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may 
obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and this section. 
Also determinative, is Utah Code Ann. § 630-4-401, a subsection of the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act. That subsection states in its entirety: 
63G-4-401. Judicial review -- Exhaustion of administrative 
remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency 
action, except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited 
by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all 
administrative remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust 
administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that 
exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of 
the requirement to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring 
exhaustion. 
3 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final 
agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting 
the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued 
under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b ). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet the form 
requirements specified in this chapter. 
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act defines the term "party" at Utah 
~ Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2009): 
( 1) As used in this chapter: 
**** 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person commencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to 
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule 
to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
**** 
The full text of each provision and of the following, other relevant 
statutes is set out in Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(1) and (8) (West Supp. 2014) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a trial court decision 
dismissing Utah Alunite Corporation's (UAC) and the Utah School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration's (SITLA) suit to judicially review a 
State Engineer administrative order. That order, the product of an informal 
administrative proceeding, is a final agency action under the Utah 
4 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA). Utah Code Ann. §§ 630-4-101 to -
601 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014). Neither UAC nor SITLA participated in the 
State Engineer's informal proceeding, R. 4 (,r 17), 14-16, 23-37, 86, and each 
lacked standing to bring the trial court suit below. That court correctly granted ~ 
the State Engineer's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Course of Proceedings. Together, on July 21, 2014, UAC and SITLA 
(Plaintiffs), filed a "Petition for Judicial Review," R. 1-3 7, seeking de novo 
review of the Central Iron County Water Conservancy District's (CICWCD's) 
Application to Appropriate water from the Wah Wah Valley, File No. 69-101 
(A 76677), (Application). The State Engineer filed his Motion to Dismiss for 
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction on July 31, 2014 (Motion to Dismiss), R. 
50-52, supported by a simultaneously filed Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Dismiss. R. 53-70. CICWCD joined the State Engineer's motion and also 
filed its own motion to dismiss on August 6, 2014. R. 78-80. 
Plaintiffs opposed each motion in a single memorandum (Opposition 
Memo) on August 18, 2014, R. 84-102, to which CICWCD and the State 
Engineer replied. R. 264-95; 305-12, respectively. On a Request to Submit, R. ~ 
315-17, Judge Lyman issued his "Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to 
Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction" on September 18, 2014. R. 
320-30. UAC and SITLA filed a "Notice of Appeal" for the non-final order on 
5 
October 1, 2014, R. 331-33, and an "Amended and Renewed Notice of Appeal" 
on October 10, 2014. R. 377-79. After Judge Lyman entered the "Final Order 
and Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter 
~ Jurisdiction" on October 8, 2014, R. 351-62, (attached hereto as Addendum 
B), UAC and SITLA initiated this appeal, which the Utah Supreme Court 
transferred to this Court on October 17, 2014. R. 383-86. 1 
Statement of Relevant Facts. CICWCD initiated an informal 
adjudicative proceeding with the State Engineer on October 17, 2006 when it 
filed the Application to appropriate 12,000 acre-feet of water from the Wah 
Wah Valley for stockwatering and municipal use. R. 14. The State Engineer 
designated the Application on his files as 69-101 (A76677), R. 14, and 
published notice to potential protestants on four dates in November 2006, R. 14. 
1 This Court may disregard the record documents dealing with the "Partial 
Stipulation to Motion to Consolidate" and other documents labeled with Civil 
No. 140500022, R. 365-76, 387-405, because they have no bearing on this 
appeal. Plaintiffs mistakenly, electronically filed documents at R. 365-69, 
370-73, a "Partial Stipulation to Motion to Consolidate" and proposed order in 
this case instead of the case for which they were intended, Civil No. 
140500022. When Judge Lyman mistakenly entered the proposed order, R. 
387-90, Plaintiffs moved to set aside that order, R. 393-96, and Judge Lyman 
entered the proposed order, R. 397-98, on October 31, 2014. R. 402-03. 
6 
The State Engineer received numerous protests, but none from Plaintiffs. 2 R. 
14-16. 
The State Engineer evaluated the Application under Utah Code Ann. § 
73-3-8. R. 18. Consistent therewith, he carefully analyzed the recharge rate of 
the valley and other factors that impact the statutory criteria as they relate to the 
Application. R. 18-21. The State Engineer held a hearing on the Application 
on July 14, 2010. R. 16. After considering the sparsely populated valley's arid 
hydrology and available water under the statute, he approved CICWCD's 
Application by final agency action- an administrative order issued May 13, 
2014. R. 14-23. The order approved the municipal use ofup to 6,525 acre-feet 
of water and rejected the stockwatering use for 2000 livestock (about 56 acre-
feet per year). R. 21. Neither UAC nor SITLA protested or appeared before the 
State Engineer in that administrative proceeding. R. 4 (,r 17), 14-16, 23-37, 86. 
The State Engineer's order approving the Application resulted from routine 
informal adjudicative proceedings administered under Utah Code Ann. Section 
73-3-8. R. 55, n. I; Utah Admin. Code R. 655-6-2 (LexisNexis 2012). 
Although neither was a party to that proceeding, on June 2, 2014, UAC and 
SITLA filed with the State Engineer a letter purporting to seek agency 
2 The State Engineer agrees that UAC was not a going concern in 
November 2006, but SITLA was. 
7 
·lo@) 
reconsideration of CICWCD's Application, R. 62-70. That letter also requested 
reconsideration ofUAC and SITLA's August 12, 2012 Application to 
Appropriate, which is not at issue in this appeal. R. 7 (,r 36), 62-70.3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Any plaintiff seeking judicial review of informal agency actions must do 
so "in accordance with" UAPA and Section 73-3-14. Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-
14(l)(a) (West Supp. 2014). This statute must be read plainly, giving effect to 
all statutory terms. Thus, to invoke statutory jurisdiction under UAP A to bring 
suit, id. § 63G-4-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014), a prospective plaintiff must be 
both a "person aggrieved" and a "party aggrieved." Plaintiffs failed to 
participate in the agency action on CICWCD's Application. In light of 
applicable statutes and case law, that failure is fatal to their effort to seek 
judicial review of the State Engineer's resulting order. 
Similarly, because UAPA mandates that its provisions may be 
...;) overwritten only explicitly, id. § 63G-4-102(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014), and 
Subsection 73-3-14(1)(a) does not explicitly replace UAPA party status with 
3 UAC and SITLA filed their own application to appropriate Wah Wah 
Valley water in 2012, six years junior to CICWCD's Application. Although 
both appropriation applications were decided in 2014 and gave the junior 
appropriators more immediate use of the water, each application was a separate 
proceeding. Further, as a matter of established law, because CICWCD's 
application was first in time, it was first in right under Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-
21.1 (2)( a) (West Supp. 2014). 
8 
"person" status, UAP A's narrowly defined "party" requirement restricts judicial 
review to only those who participated in an administrative proceeding. Id. § 
63G-4-103(f) (West 2009). But even if, arguendo, Subsection 73-3-14(l)(a)'s 
"person" status did control UAP A jurisdiction, ample case law specifies that to 
qualify as a "person aggrieved" who may seek judicial review of an agency 
decision, a person or entity must likewise have participated in the related 
administrative proceeding. 
Further, because Plaintiffs delayed their involvement with CICWCD's 
Application until the State Engineer completed his proceeding, laches and 
sound public policy further militate against Plaintiffs interposing themselves at 




PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE 
STATE ENGINEER'S ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION BECAUSE 
NEITHER WAS A PARTY TO CICWCD'S WATER 
APPLICATION PROCEEDING. 
A. Only a "party" may seek judicial review. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1, et. seq., and the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-101, et. seq. govern actions before 
the State Engineer. Pertinent here, Section 73-3-14(1) states, "A person 
aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act [UAP A], 
~ and this section." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1) (West Supp. 2014). UAPA, in 
tum, clarifies that only "[a] party aggrieved," by an informal administrative 
proceeding, "may obtain judicial review of final agency action." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-4-40l(l)(a) (West 2009). Read plainly, see Mallory v. Brigham 
Young University, 2014 UT 27, ,r 13, 332 P.3d 922, because the statute says 
UAPA and Section 73-3-14 govern judicial review of administrative decisions, 
anyone seeking such review of a State Engineer order must be able to satisfy the 
rigors of both statutes. Namely, to invoke jurisdiction under UAPA, the party 
or person seeking review must have been a party to the State Engineer's related 
administrative proceedings. Here, because neither SITLA nor UAC participated 
10 
as a "party" in the proceedings before the State Engineer, the trial court 
correctly ruled that each lacked standing to initiate proceedings in the court 
below. 
That a plaintiff must be both a "person aggrieved" and a "party 
aggrieved" to proceed under UAP A is not remarkable. UAPA is replete with 
use of the term "party," clarifying the legislature's intent and policy choice that 
only those who participate in agency proceedings - as opposed to those who 
wait until proceedings have concluded - may later seek judicial review of an 
agency decision. Repeatedly using the term "party," UAPA specifies that, "[a] 
party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action[,]" id. § 
63G-4-401(1) (West 2009) (emphasis added); that "[a]party may seek judicial 
review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available," id. § 
63G-4-401(2) (emphasis added); and, that "[a]party shall file a petition for 
judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after ... the order ... is 
issued[.]" Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a) (emphasis added). Further, when UAPA spells '"' 
out its jurisdictional grant for judicial review, it says "[t]he petition for judicial 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings ... shall include: ... (vi) facts 
demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled to obtain judicial 
review[.]" Id. § 63G-4-402(2)(a) (West Supp. 2014) (emphasis added). 
11 
UAP A defines a "party" as "the agency or other person commencing an 
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding 
officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or 
~ agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding." Id. § 
63G-4-103(f) (West 2009). Neither UAC nor SITLA fit any of these definitions 
and therefore neither may invoke UAP A jurisdiction to seek judicial review of 
the administrative action here.4 
Such a plain reading, moreover, is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's prior application ofUAPA. In Taylor-West Weber Water Improvement 
District v. Olds et al., 2009 UT 86,224 P.3d 709, the Court recognized that 
UAP A's party requirements govern judicial review of State Engineer orders. 
There, citing directly to UAP A, the Court said "[ u ]pon an adverse ruling in an 
informal agency adjudication conducted by the state engineer, an aggrieved 
party may seek judicial review of the district court[,]" id. ,r 5 ( citing Utah Code 
Ann.§§ 63G-4-401 to -402 (2008)); also "[u]nder UAPA, only parties that have 
4 In addition to Plaintiffs' failure to invoke UAP A jurisdiction, because 
they lack "party" status, two related bases prevent Plaintiffs from seeking 
judicial review of the State Engineer's order approving CICWCD's Application. 
First, because Plaintiffs failed to participate in the administrative proceeding 
they have no standing to bring suit; similarly, they have failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies. See Id. § 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014); id. § 
63G-4-401(1) and (2) (West 2009); and id. § 63G-4-402 (West Supp. 2014). 
Either additional basis provides independent and sufficient reason to dismiss the 
instant case. 
12 
exhausted their administrative remedies by participating in the agency 
adjudication may seek judicial review." Id. ,r 8 (citing to Utah Code Ann.§ 
63G-4-401(2)).5 Further, the Court observed, "UAPA governs judicial review 
of state agency action .... Once a party has exhausted its administrative 
remedies, it may seek district court review of 'final agency actions resulting 
from informal adjudicative proceedings."' Taylor West, 2009 UT 86, il 6 
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1)(b) and -402(1)(a)). Plaintiffs' 
attempt, therefore, to parse UAPA, or to circumvent its plain requirements, 
should not prevail. But like the plaintiff in Taylor West, by failing to perfect 
their interest in the proceedings before the State Engineer, UAC and SITLA had 
no right, before the trial court, to initiate judicial review. See Taylor-West, 
2009 UT 86, iJ 6; Id. ,I 9 (citing S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 
(Utah 1990) ("[Plaintiff] waived its right to judicial review by failing to 
participate in the administrative proceedings.")). 
B. Utah Code Ann. Section 73-3-14 neither preempts UAP A nor 
supersedes UAPA's party requirements. 
Plaintiffs' contend at Section VI. A. 2. of their brief that "Section 
73-3-14(1)(a) controls the right to judicial review of a State Engineer order, not 
the general provisions of the UAPA." Pis' Br. 13 (heading capitalization 
5 Critical to the Taylor-West Court's reasoning is that a party initiated the 
suit. 
13 
altered). This argument focuses only on the "person aggrieved" language of 
that section, Pis' Br. 13-14, to the detriment of the remaining language of 
Subsection 14(l)(a), and also the plain language ofUAPA, in accordance with 
which Section 73-3-14(l)(a) must be read. Mallory, 2014 UT 27, ~ 13 (when 
interpreting a statute's meaning, a court should seek to render all parts relevant 
and meaningful, "avoiding an interpretation which renders portions of, or words 
in, a statute superfluous or inoperative.") (quoting Platts v. Parents Helping 
Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997)); also Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 1 
16, 158 P.3d 540 ("[T]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, 
and its provisions interpreted in harmony with ... other statutes under ... 
related chapters.") (quoting State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ~ 8, 63 P.3d 667 
(initial capitalization in original)). 
Plaintiffs presented neither contention in the trial court, but argued below 
only that Plaintiffs had effectively exhausted their administrative remedies or 
v:J need not exhaust under a UAP A exception. R. 92-99.6 Because Plaintiffs raise 
the arguments for the first time on appeal, they are not preserved and are also 
not properly before this Court. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, 
6 In fact, the only time Plaintiffs mention Section 73-3-14 in their 
Opposition Memo is to quote the "person aggrieved" language just before 
launching into their exhaustion argument. R. 92. All other substantive 
exhaustion arguments of Plaintiffs' Opposition Memo focus on UAPA. 
14 
,I,I 14-15, 266 P.3d 828 (Utah's appellate courts do not address new arguments, 
claims, issues, or matters for the first time on appeal). As the Court put it, "The 
two primary considerations underlying the rule are judicial economy and 
fairness." Id. ,I 15. Further, the preservation requirement "prevents a party 
from avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on 
appeal if the strategy fails." Id. ( quoting Tschaggeny v. Milbank Ins. Co., 2007 
UT 37, ,r 20, 163 P.3d 615) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Plaintiffs proffer the new argument in an apparent attempt to circumvent 
the pitfalls and insufficiencies of the arguments they made unsuccessfully 
below. Plaintiffs' actions precluded defendants from having the opportunity to 
respond to this theory before Judge Lyman. Because Plaintiffs failed to 
preserve the issue or to raise this argument in the district court, this Court 
should ignore the argument presented for the first time in Section VI. A. 2. of 
Plaintiffs' Brief. 
Notwithstanding their failure to preserve this argument, Plaintiffs' 
contention that Section 73-3-14 alone controls their right of review fails on the 
merits. Pertinent here, respecting judicial review, Section 73-3-14(l)(a) states, 
in its entirety and with the State Engineer's emphasis: "A person aggrieved by 
an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in accordance with 
[UAPA] and this section." Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014). 
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The phrase Plaintiffs omit has meaning. It's meaning is plain. Neither 
Plaintiffs, the State Engineer, the trial court, nor this Court are free to ignore it. 
But the term "in accordance with" means in agreement or in conformity with, 
\;ff) not, as Plaintiffs contend, in derogation of. 
Respecting parties, UAP A Section 63G-4-102(1) states: 
Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as 
otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this 
chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, the provisions of this 
chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: (a) state 
agency action that determines the legal rights ... of an identifiable 
person ... ; and (b) judicial review of the action. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014). This section establishes 
. 
viJJ two things: (1) UAP A directly governs district court 'judicial review" of 
agency actions; and (2) a statute may supersede a provision of UAP A only by 
"explicit reference." Id. 
Although it uses the term "person" not "party," Subsection 73-3-14(l)(a) 
permits judicial review of an order of the State Engineer when that review is 
sought "in accordance with" UAP A. Under UAPA, district courts have 
jurisdiction for judicial review of an agency action when a "party" to that action 
initiates a suit. Id. §§ 63G-4-102(1), -401(1), -402(1)(a) (West 2009 & Supp. 
2014). Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, see Pls' Br. 13-15, Section 
73-3-14(1)(a) does not supersede or replace UAP A-conferred jurisdiction, see 
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-103(±) (West 2009), but contemplates action in 
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conformity therewith. This interpretation of Subsection 73-3-14(1)(a) becomes 
even more evident based on a plain reading of Section 73-3-14 's remaining 
provisions. Unlike Subsection 14(1 ), Subsection 14(7) does explicitly supersede 
some UAPA requirements. There, the legislature says: 
A person who files a petition for judicial review is not 
required to: 
(a) nothwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-401(3)(b), name a 
respondent that is not required by this section; and 
(b) nothwithstanding Subsection 63G-4-402(2)(a)(iv), identify all 
parties to the adjudicative proceeding. 
Id. § 73-3-14(7) (West Supp. 2014). Plaintiffs read too much into the absence 
of similar, explicit language in Section 73-3-14(1)(a). This Court should not do 
the same. 
Next, admitting that under UAP A the definition of "party" is "more 
restrictive" than the definition of "person," Pls' Br. 12, Plaintiffs nevertheless 
fail to apply their own rule that "to the extent the statutes conflict, 'the more 
specific provision will prevail over the more general provision."' Pis' Br. 14, 
(citing Williams v. Pub. Serv. Comm 'n, 754 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1988)). 
Plaintiffs' dogged reliance on Williams proves too much. In that case the Utah 
Supreme Court held that where the more specific Public Utilities Act conflicted 
with the Administrative Rulemaking Act, the Public Utilities Act controlled. 
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Plaintiffs assert "The UAPA's relation to Section 73-3-14 is no different." Pis' 
Br. 15. Plaintiffs err.7 
Unlike the Rulemaking Act, Section 63G-4-102(1) ofUAPA states the 
vi; Act applies to all agency judicial review actions unless superseded by "explicit 
reference." Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) (West Supp. 2014). At least two 
Utah appellate opinions recognize both the import of Section 63G-4-102(1) and 
supersession only by "explicit reference" to UAPA. See Utah Sign, Inc. v. Utah 
Dep 't ofTransp., 896 P.2d 632, 634-35 (Utah 1995) (holding that UAPA 
governed judicial review of administrative actions where the specific Highway 
sections in question did not supersede UAP A by reference); Hidden Valley Coal 
Co. v. Utah Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 866 P.2d 564, 567 (Utah App. 1993) 
(recognizing that the Utah Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, as it then existed, 
specifically superseded UAP A). 
Moreover, to read "person aggrieved" to include only a protestant, 
...aJ Plaintiffs overlook that in Section 73-3-14(l)(a) "person" may refer to either an 
unsatisfied protestant or to an unhappy applicant. They assert, "If only a 'party' 
7 Merriam-Webster defines "accordance" as "agreement, conformity, <in 
accordance with a rule>." Merriam-Webster, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/accordance (last visited Apr. 9, 
2015). If Section 73-3-14(1)(a) and UAPA must be read in agreement, or 
conformity, with one another, Section 73-3-14 cannot, as Plaintiffs suggest, 
create a conflict with UAP A that must be resolved via rules of statutory 
construction. Thus, Williams, which rules on such a conflict, is inapposite. 
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can seek judicial review, it makes no sense for the legislature to provide 
different requirements for '[a] person who files a petition' and 'a protestant in 
the adjudicative proceedings who files a petition.'" Pis' Br. 13. But it is 
because applicants before the State Engineer are also parties to his 
proceedings, the term "person" can and does encompass unsatisfied applicants 
without also being so broad as to include everyone, or anyone. Thus, while 
either "person" - a protestant or applicant - may seek judicial review because 
each was a party to the agency proceedings, an applicant need not name herself, 
because as the party who initially "requested the adjudicative proceeding," the 
reference would already be clear. Not so, however, for a protestant-
consequently, only a protestant need name the applicant as a respondent in her 
petition. See Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(4) and (4)(a). 
C. Plaintiffs misstate and misinterpret the history of Section 
73-3-14. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertions, in Section 73-3-14, "party" refers only 
to those who are parties to a court action, not to administrative parties as UAP A 
defines them. Id. § 73-3-14(6) and (7). Plaintiffs assert, "The legislature 
clearly had the UAPA in mind when it enacted Section 73-3-14, as the provision 
allows a 'person aggrieved' by an order of the State Engineer to obtain judicial 
review in accordance with Chapter 4 of the UAPA." Plaintiffs' Br. 13-14. But 
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Section 73-3-14's history belies this conclusion. The "person aggrieved" 
language first appeared in 1937, Act of Mar. 11, 1937, ch. 130, § 1, 1937 Utah 
Laws 237,239, while UAPA appeared in 1987, Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act, ch. 161, §§ 257-77, 1987 Utah Laws 830, 954-63, at which time Section 
73-3-14(l)(a) was altered to read, in its entirety, "[a]ny person aggrieved by an 
order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review by following the 
procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63 [UAPA]." Id. § 295, at 
971. 
Plaintiffs' interpretation of Section 73-3-14 "person aggrieved" as post-
dating UAPA is mistaken. Most or all of Title 73 evolved from statutes that 
long predate UAPA and UAPA terminology. Compare Act of Mar. 13, 1919, 
ch. 67, § 54, 1919 Utah Laws 177, 193 ("[T]he individual, corporation or 
association affected by such [State Engineer] decision[] shall have sixty days to 
appeal therefrom to the district court .... "), and Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-14 
(1980) ("[A]ny person aggrieved by such [State Engineer] decision may within 
sixty days ... bring a civil action in the district court for a plenary review 
.-.E) thereof'), with Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("A person 
aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial review in 
accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, ... [UAPA] and this section."). 
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This statutory history also illustrates the shift from Section 73-3-14 
granting jurisdiction for judicial review of State Engineer decisions to UAP A, 
by reference, establishing and governing such jurisdiction. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63G-4-102(1) (Declaring that Chapter 4, UAP A, governs the judicial review 
of all agency actions unless specifically excepted); Id. § 63G-4-401 (1) (West 
2009) ("A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review .... "); and Id. § 
63G-4-402(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014) ("The district courts have jurisdiction to 
review by trial de nova all final agency actions resulting from informal 
adjudicative proceedings [ except for those relating to juveniles.]"). 
But even without the support of historical analysis, Section 
73-3-14(1)(a)'s use of the term "person," does not supersede UAP A's advised 
use of the term "party" throughout the applicable subsections that govern 
judicial review of agency actions. Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that: ( 1) "[ t ]he 
legislature clearly had the UAP A in mind when it enacted Section 73-3-14[,]" 
Pis' Br. 13-14; (2) Section 73-3-14 is more specific than and hence controls 
over UAPA, Pls' Br. 15; and (3) Section 73-3-14's "plain language" allows any 
"person aggrieved" to seek judicial review, Pls' Br. 12. None of these 
erroneous arguments can substitute for an "explicit reference" in Section 
73-3-14 indicating that the term "person" as used in that section supercedes the 
term "party" as used in UAP A. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-102(1) ("[E]xcept 
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as otherwise provided by a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by 
explicit reference[,] ... the provisions of this chapter ... govern ... state 
agency action ... and ... judicial review of the action."). No such explicit 
vJ reference exists. Indeed, Section 73-3-14 says precisely the opposite. 
II. EVEN IF, ARGUENDO, UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 73-3-14 
CONTROLS JURISDICTION, SECTION 73-3-14 ALSO 
REQUIRES THAT A PERSON PARTICIPATE IN THE STATE 
ENGINEER'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS BEFORE SEEKING 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE AGENCY DECISION. 
As the trial court below correctly determined, neither UAC nor SITLA 
may invoke the district court's jurisdiction to hear their suit because neither 
meet the UAPA definition of"party." R. 356-58. But assuming, arguendo, 
Section 73-3-14 may be read independently from - not in accordance with-
U AP A, as Plaintiffs suggest, based on a reading of a predecessor statute and 
cases interpreting it, Plaintiffs' arguments still fail. 8 
Before Section 73-3-14 read "[a] person aggrieved," it read "any person 
~ aggrieved." See Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (1980); Act of Mar. 5, 2008, ch. 
165, § 1, 2008 Utah Laws 1250, 1250. And converse to Plaintiffs' suggestion 
under the present statute, every case construing the applicable, prior language 
8 Curiously, here, just as Plaintiffs urge this Court to read section 
73-3-14(l)(a) independently from UAPA, Plaintiffs themselves attempt to 
define the term "person" as used in Subsection 14(l)(a) as it were the same term 
as used in UAPA. See Pl's Br. 12. 
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assumed or required a plaintiff's prior participation in administrative 
proceedings before that plaintiff could seek judicial review. See Wash. Cnty. 
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, ,r,r 4, 11-12, 82 P.3d 1125 
(construing post-UAP A version of Section 73-3-14); S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, 
797 P.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Utah 1990) (construing pre-UAPA version of 
Section 73-3-14); and Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 497-99 (Utah 1989) 
( construing pre-UAP A version of Section 73-3-14 ). 
To this end, S & G is instructive. There, the Court likewise construed the 
pre-UAPA statute granting court jurisdiction over "any person aggrieved" to 
require that person's participation first in the related agency proceedings. 797 
P.2d 1085, 1086-87 n.1 (Utah 1990). In that case, plaintiff S & G sold water 
rights to the Intermountain Power Agency (IP A). IP A, in tum, filed an 
application with the State Engineer to change S & G's use of water, stipulating 
in its contract with S & G that IP A's payment would be according to the amount 
of water the State Engineer approved for change. S & G took no part in the 
State Engineer's administrative action. Id. at 1086. Later, however, when the 
State Engineer approved an amount of water less than S & G claimed it used, S 
& G sought judicial review, making an argument remarkably similar to UAC 
and SITLA's arguments here: 
S & G contends that prior to the 1987 amendment 
[incorporating UAP A], section 73-3-14 did "not impose a 
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requirement of prior participation in the administrative process." 
The statute authorizes judicial review for "any person aggrieved by 
[ the state engineer's] decision." 
Id. at 1087. 
As this Court should do here, the Supreme Court declined to read the 
Section 73-3-14 's "any person aggrieved" language so broadly. Id. at 1087-88. 
"A person aggrieved[,]" the Court said, imposed a "requirement of participation 
in the administrative process." Id. at 1087. The present version of Section 
73-13-14(1)(a) requires nothing less. 
Next, in Bonham, the Supreme Court sustained the judicial review by a 
plaintiff non-water user who protested a neighbor's change application claiming 
the change would flood his property. Id. 788 P.2d at 497-98. Citing the 
version of Section 73-3-14 then in place, the Court emphasized that because 
public welfare was part of the change application analysis, the language "any 
person aggrieved" in that pre-UAP A statute, id. at 498, included Bonham's 
injury, allowing him to seek judicial review because he was an aggrieved 
protestant, if not a water user. See id. at 498-99. In short, the Utah Supreme 
~ Court recognized a protestant who participated in the administrative action as a 
"person aggrieved." 
Finally, in Washington County Water Conservancy District, a post-
UAP A case decided under the prior Section 73-3-14, rather than rely on 
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UAPA's definition of"person," the Washington County Court contrasted the 
more narrow "any person aggrieved" phrase of Section 73-3-14 with the 
broader "[ a ]ny person interested" phrase which defines who may file an 
administrative protest under Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-7(1) (1989). The Utah 
Supreme Court found that although anyone interested may protest an 
application to the State Engineer, not all protestants may seek judicial review of 
the resulting order: 
Were we to interpret the phrase "any person aggrieved" to include 
all interested persons who protest a change application, the filing 
of a change application would expose the underlying water rights 
to otherwise unavailable forfeiture challenges, because an 
uninjured protestant would be able to insert its foot into an 
otherwise closed jurisdictional door. 
2003 UT 58, ~ 16 (emphasis added). This language allows "interested" persons 
to seek judicial review only if they are also "aggrieved." It assumes, even 
without the UAP A strictures, that the plaintiffs must first have participated 
before the State Engineer. The Washington County court explained that, 
contrary to the conservancy district's argument, only aggrieved protestants may 
seek judicial review. Id.~ 13 (citing Bonham, 788 P.2d at 498 ("[T]here was no 
question that the protesting plaintiffs could demonstrate particularized injury .. 
. . " ( emphasis added)). 
These pre and post-UAP A decisions interpreting Section 73-3-14 all 
assumed or required that only applicants or protestants to an agency proceeding 
25 
may seek judicial review of an agency action. None reference UAP A "party" 
requirements, but all construe "any person aggrieved" to mean only those who 
were prior administrative participants - even if the pre-UAP A Section 73-3-14 
v;}J authorized the court's jurisdiction. Thus, arguendo, even if Plaintiffs were 
correct that Section 73-3-14 provides a basis for court jurisdiction separate from 
UAPA, that section grants no more or different jurisdiction than does UAPA. 
III. PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT NOW SEEK JUDICIAL REVIEW 
WHERE THEY SLUMBERED ON THEIR RIGHTS 
CONCERNING WAH WAH VALLEY WATER. 
In addition to the grounds previously mentioned, this Court may affirm 
the trial court on any alternative basis evident in the record. See Bailey v. 
Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 113, 52 P.3d 1158. When addressing Plaintiffs' 
exhaustion arguments the trial court noted the sheer amount of time that 
Plaintiffs waited prior to seeking any relief. R. 359. To now allow Plaintiffs to 
judicially adjust CICWCD's Application in light of Plaintiffs' concerns works a 
disadvantage to the process and a prejudice not only to the parties, but to 
judicial economy as well. This Court should reject Plaintiffs' efforts. 
Laches is a "delay that works a disadvantage to another." Papanikolas 
Bros. Enters. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 
1975). The doctrine of laches, in turn, contains two elements: one party's lack 
of diligence and injury to another party as result. See Angelos v. First Interstate 
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Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). Whether laches appropriately applies is 
circumstantial: 
The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence 
"depend[ s] on the circumstances of each case,' because 'the 
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the gravity 
of the prejudice suffered ... and the length of [the] delay." 
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Lindberg, 20 I 0 
UT 51, ,r 28,238 P.3d 1054 (quoting Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1260). 
Application of the doctrine of laches hinges on "the relative harm caused by the 
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the 
respondent acted in good faith." Id. 
Concerning exhaustion, Plaintiffs argue in part that UAC and SITLA did ew 
not protest in 2006 because the State Engineer delayed the hearing on the 
CICWCD's 2006 Application until 2010. Pls' Br. 18 ("That delay [between 
notice and hearing] prevented UAC and SITLA from protesting CICWCD's 
application in November 2006 .... "). They continue, "[i]t also prevented UAC 
and SITLA from participating in the hearing in July 201 O." Pls' Br. 18. But the 
State Engineer's delay after 2006 could not have prevented UAC and SITLA 
from protesting the Application in 2006 or from participating in the 2010 
hearing. These arguments can hardly have been offered in the good faith 
Lindberg requires because UAC and SITLA also assert they "did not [protest] 
for the simple reason that they had no interest in the Wah Wah Valley's 
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groundwater in either November 2006 or July 2010." Pis' Br. 6-7. If UAC had 
no such interest in 2006, how could it be aggrieved by an application with a 
2006 priority date? And if SITLA is aggrieved, as a landowner in the valley it 
l.4fi) has had an ongoing interest in the valley's water since long before 2006. See R. 
357. Further, UAC and SITLA entered into a three-year exploration agreement 
as early as April 2011. R. 6, ,r 27. Thus, as a landowner with inevitable water 
needs, SITLA had an interest in the water when the State Engineer published 
notice of CICWCD's Application in November 2006. Plaintiffs, particularly 
SITLA, sat on their hands when CICWCD applied for the water in 2006, when 
the State Engineer held a hearing in 2010, and even when, in 2012, SITLA, 
itself, applied for a junior priority water right in Wah Wah Valley. Plaintiffs' 
junior priority water application and whatever opportunities it provides cannot 
substitute for Plaintiffs' protesting the CICWCD Application. Thus, the 
doctrine of laches bars Plaintiffs' suit. 
..i; IV. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF 
JURISDICTION. 
Under Plaintiffs' erroneous reading of UAP A and Section 73-3-14, they 
first assert they are "aggrieved" persons under Section 73-3-14; then they claim 
that "Section 73-3-14(1)(a) grants a 'person aggrieved' a right to judicial review 
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in accordance with the UAPA." Pls' Br. 16.9 Citing to, but ignoring, UAPA's 
plain language, they further claim that as a "person aggrieved," they have the 
right to exhaust because "Section 63G-4-401 (2) provides that ' [a] party may 
seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies 
available."' Pis' Br. 16-17. This also, of course, skips over Section 
63G-4-401(1) (West 2009), specifying that "[a]party aggrieved may obtain 
judicial review of final agency action." (Emphasis added); see also Taylor-West, 
2009 UT 86, 11 8 ("Under UAP A, only parties ... may seek judicial review ... 
. ") (citing Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401(2)). In short, by picking and choosing 
the parts of UAP A they want to apply, Plaintiffs arguments would lead to suits 
for judicial review of agency actions being initiated by anyone who claims harm 
from a State Engineer decision, whether or not she participated in the related 
administrative process. That would tum upside-down not only UAPA's specific 
requirements, but basic principles of administrative law as well. 
9 Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' claims that they are aggrieved, which the 
trial court did not decide and are therefore not established facts, the issue before 
the Court is not whether UAC or SITLA are "aggrieved" under Washington 
County Water Conservancy Dist., 2003 UT 58, ,I,I 16-17 (construing 
"aggrieved" as part of the "any person aggrieved" language in Section 73-3-14). 
Rather, this case turns on whether Plaintiffs, who did not participate in the 
agency deliberations on an application, may seek that application's judicial 
review under Section 73-3-14 and UAPA. 
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This Court should not circumnavigate UAP A's straightf01ward 
jurisdictional grant to parties by holding that Section 73-3-14(1) broadens the 
UAPA exhaustion limitations to include persons who claim to be aggrieved by a 
viJ State Engineer order. Pls' Br. 10 ("UAC and SITLA have standing to seek 
judicial review so long as they exhausted available administrative remedies"). 
To allow strangers to an agency action to seek judicial review goes against the 
sound policy of encouraging administrative participation. Plaintiffs should not 
be allowed to sit back, wait to see an agency's order, and then assert that 
exhaustion requirements have either been met or that it would now be futile to 
attempt to meet them. 10 
The State Engineer had no duty to ensure the Plaintiffs participated in the 
administrative proceeding. And the State Engineer's delay in issuing an order 
did not prevent, or in any way influence, SITLA' s administrative participation. 
The fact that UAC did not exist when the State Engineer initiated his 
viJ administrative process simply means that UAC by itself may not seek judicial 
review of the resulting decision. An entity that could not have exhausted its 
administrative remedies with respect to an administrative proceeding by 
10 Of course, individuals who own water rights impaired by a State 
Engineer order may seek redress through a private action for that impairment 
whether or not they participated in the administrative proceeding that produced 
the order. 
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participating in that proceeding simply may not initiate judicial review of the 
resulting administrative decision. But, under Taylor-West it may participate in 
such review if a party who meets all Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and UAP A 
requirements initiates the review. 2009 UT 86, ,r 9 ("[F]ailure to participate at 
the administrative level ... does not affect that party's right under Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 24 to intervene in a de novo judicial review proceeding 
initiated by another party .... ") (citing S & G, 797 P.2d at 1087); See also Utah 
Code Ann.§ 63G-4-402(2)(b) (West Supp. 2014) ("[A]dditional pleadings and 
proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure .... "). SITLA did exist at the time the District filed its Application 
and could have participated in the State Engineer's administrative process had it 
chosen to do so. 
Further, established law and policy mean Plaintiffs are not entitled to 
judicial review. Plaintiffs assert that they and CICWCD have "competing 
applications." Pis' Br. 19. But UAC's 2012 application does not "compete" 
with CICWCD's 2006 Application because Subsection 73-3-21.1(2)(a) of the 
Utah Code provides "Appropriators shall have priority among themselves 
according to the dates of their respective appropriations, so that each 
appropriator is entitled to receive the appropriator's whole supply before any 
subsequent appropriator has any right." And, except for certain circumstances 
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that don't apply here, "the priority of an application is determined by the day on 
which the state engineer's office receives the written application." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 73-3-18(4) (West Supp. 2014). 11 
Sound public policy requires protestants to bring their issues to the 
attention of the State Engineer. Bringing suit without participating in an agency 
proceeding ignores this policy. As the Utah Supreme Court said in S & G, Inc., 
"persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 'may not, by 
refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such agencies, by-pass them, 
and call upon the courts to determine ... matters properly determinable 
originally by such agencies."' 797 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Utah 1990) (alteration in 
original) (quoting People v. Keith Ry. Equip. Co., 161 P.2d 244,249 (Cal. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1945). The Court should not allow Plaintiffs to do so here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State Engineer respectfully requests the 
-..J Court to affirm the district court's proper dismissal of Plaintiffs' action for lack 
of jurisdiction. 
11 These inapplicable circumstances include applications that lapse or are 
otherwise reduced in priority under Utah Code Ann.§§ 73-3-5.6, 73-3-12, 73-3-
20, or 73-3-18(2) {West Supp. 2014). Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-18(4) (West 
Supp. 2014). 
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Because the procedural posture of this case includes the State Engineer as 
a statutory defendant at the trial below, and because oral argument would help 
the Court understand the questions of fact and law particular to water at issue in ~ 
this matter, Defendant State Engineer encourages the Court to hold oral 
argument for this case. 
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Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14(1)(a) (West Supp. 2014): 
73-3-14. Judicial review of state engineer order. 
(1) (a) A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may obtain judicial 
review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, 
and this section. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-401 (West 2009): 
63G-4-401. Judicial review-- Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(I) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if 
this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm 
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is 
issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b ). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-102(1) and (8) (West Supp. 2014): 
63G-4 ... t02. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(I) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by a 
statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this chapter, 
the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and govern: 
(a) state agency action that determines the legal rights, duties, privileges, 
immunities, or other legal interests of an identifiable person, including agency 
action to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an 
authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of the action. 
* * * * 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent basis for 
jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
* * * * 
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-103(l)(f) (West 2009): 
63G-4-103. Definitions. 
(1) As used in this chapter: 
* * * * 
(f) "Party" means the agency or other person connnencing an adjudicative 
proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the presiding officer to 
intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to 
participate as parties in an adjudicative proceeding. 
**** 
Utah Code Ann.§ 630-4-402 (West Supp 2014): 
63G-4-402. Judicial review -- Informal adjudicative proceedings. 
(l)(a) The district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final 
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the 
juvenile courts have jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating to: 
(i) the removal or placement of children in state custody; 
(ii) the support of children under Subsection (l)(a)(i) as detennined 
administratively under Section 78A-6-1106; and 
(iii) substantiated findings of abuse or neglect made by the Division of 
Child and Family Services, after an evidentiary hearing. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall be as 
provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of such a venue 
provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or maintains the petitioner's 
principal place of business. 
(2)(a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial review; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, together 
with a copy, summary, or brief description of the agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceeding; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is entitled 
to obtain judicial review; 
( vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested;· and 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed 
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3)(a) The court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of fact and law and 
any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings. 
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KENT L. JONES, in his official capacity as 
the State Engineer, and CENTAL IRON 
COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT, 
Defendants. 
FINAL ORDER AND RULING ON 
STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION 
Civil No. 140500015 
Judge Paul D. Lyman 
The Respondent, Kent L. Jones, Utah State Engineer (hereafter "State Engineer", 
has filed the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
with an accompanying memorandum. The Petitioners, Utah Alunite Corp. (hereafter 
"UAC") and Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (hereafter 
"SITLA") have jointly filed an opposing memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a 
reply memorandum. The State Engineer has filed a Request to Submit. No party has 
filed a request for oral argument. 1 
FACTS 
For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(l) motion the factual allegations of the Petitioners' 
Petition for Judicial Review are accepted as true. Hurst v. Highway Department, 397 
P.2d 71 (Utah 1964). The following facts, accepted as true, are cited as being relevant to 
this Ruling. 
1. Petitioners Utah Alunite Corp. and the Utah School and Institutional Trust 
Lands Administration have petitioned for judicial review of the Order for 
Application to Appropriate Water No. 69-101(A76677), issued by 
Respondent Kent L. Jones, the State Engineer for the State of Utah on May 
13, 2014. 
2. Petitioner Utah Alunite Corp. is a Delaware corporation registered to do 
business in Utah and is in good standing. 
3. Petitioner Utah School and Institutional Trust lands Administration is an 
agency of the State of Utah. 
4. Respondent Kent L. Jones is the State Engineer for the State of Utah, 
1 The Court entered its Ruling on State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject 
Matter Jurisdiction on September 18, 2014. This Final Order reiterates, with a few minor 
typographical and punctuation corrections, the Court's ruling. 
Division of Water Rights . 
. '-id 5. Respondent Central Iron County Water Conservancy District (hereafter 
"CICWCD") is a water conservancy district serving certain municipalities 
~ 
and unincorporated areas in and around Iron County, Utah. 
6. The District Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-14 (l)(a) and§ 630-4-402 (l)(a). 
vi) 7. Venue lies in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 73-3-14 (l)(b) and§ 
63 G-4-402 (1 )(b) because the water source at issue or a portion of the water 
vi) 
source is located in Beaver County, Utah. 
8. The Wah Wah Valley, Pine Valley, and Hamblin Valley are located in 
Beaver County, Utah. Pine Valley is located directly to the west of the 
vi; Wah Wah Valley, and Hamblin Valley is located directly west of Pine 
Valley, along the Utah/Nevada border. 
9. On October 17, 2006, CICWCD filed an Application to Appropriate Water 
vii) 
Number 69-101 (A76677) with the State Engineer, to approp~iate 12,000 
acre feet (hereafter "af') of water annually from groundwater in the Wah 
vii Wah Valley for municipal uses, along with applications to appropriate 
water in the two other neighboring valleys. 
10. Beaver County was a protestant of CICWCD's application for an 
~ 
appropriation of groundwater from the Wah Wah Valley, along with the 
Bureau of Land Management and hundreds of other protestants. 
~ q· 0-
11. Petitioners were not protestants to these applications. 
12. In July 2010, the State Engineer conducted hearings on CICWCD's 
applications in the Wah Wah and Pine Valleys. To date, no hearings has 
been held on CICWCD's application in Hamblin Valley. 
13. In April 2011, UAC entered into a three-year exploration agreement with 
SITLA for a mining development to be located on SITLA-owned lands 
within the Wah Wah Valley (known as the "Blawn Mountain Project"). 
14. On August 21, 2012, Petitioners filed an Application to Appropriate Water 
Number 69-115 (A79462) to appropriate 6,500 af of water annually from 
the groundwater in the Wah Wah Valley for the Blawn Mountain Project. 
15. CICWCD was a protestant to Petitioners' application. Beaver County 
expressed support for the application. 
16. The State Engineer heard petitioner's application Number 69-115 (A79462) 
in November 2013. 
17. In March 2014, SITLA granted UAC a long-term mining lease to develop 
and operate the Blawn Mountain Project. 
18. On May 13, 2014, the State Engineer issued Order for Application to 
Appropriate Water No. 69-101 (A76677) in the name ofCICWCD. By the 
order, the State Engineer approved CICWCD' s appropriation of 6,525 af of 
water annually from the Wah Wah Valley for municipal use. 








Appropriate Water No. 69-115 (A79462) in the names of Petitioners. By 
the order, the State Engineer approved Petitioners' application of 6,500 af 
of water form the Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 20-year period, subject to 
CICWCD's senior water right of 6,525 af annually. 
On June 2, 2014, Beaver County and Petitioners filed separate requests for 
reconsideration of the CICWCD Order. The State Engineer denied both 
requests. 
On June 19, 2014, the State Engineer issued an Amended Order for 
Application to Appropriate Water no. 69-115 (A 79462) in the names of 
Petitioners. By this order, the State Engineer approved Petitioners' 
application for 6,500 af of water annually from Wah Wah Valley for a fixed 
30-year period, which was a 10 year period increase, subject to CICWCD's 
senior water right of 6,525 af annually. 
RULING 
Are UAC and SITLA '~varties'' entitled to judicial review? 
The Petitioners asse1t the right to bring this action pursuant to Section 73-3-14 (1) 
(a), Utah Code, wherein "A person aggrieved by an order of the state engineer may 
obtain judicial review in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, ... " 
Section 63G-4-402, Utah Code, details the law regarding judicial review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings. The complained of Order for Application to 
Appropriate Water No. 14-118 (A76676), the CICWCD Order is the product of an 
informal adjudicative proceeding. Section 63 G-4-402 (2)( a)(i) requires the name "of the 
party seeking judicial review." Sections 63G 4-4-2 (2)(a)(iv) and (vi) likewise refer to 
"parties'' and ''party" involved in the informal adjudicative proceeding. 
Similarly, Sections 63G-4-401, Utah Code Annotated limits judicial review 
actions to a ''party". (Note: all three subsections specifically reference a 'party" having 
certain rights.) Subsection 63G-4-103(l)(f) states the definition of the term "party'' as 
follows: 
''Party" means the agency or other person commencing an 
adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all persons permitted by the 
presiding officer to intervene in the proceeding, and all persons authorized 
by statute or agency rule to participate as parties in an adjudicative 
proceeding. 
The Utah Rules of Administrative Code also restrict judicial review to "any party 
aggrieved." Rule 655-6-18.A. Rule 655-6-3.F defines the term ''party" with slight 
.; ... 
variations as follows; 
"Party" means the Division (of Water Rights) or other person 
commencing an adjudicative proceeding, all respondents, all protestants, all 
persons pennitted by the Presiding Officer to intervene in the proceeding, 
and all persons authorized by statute or agency rule to participate as parties 
in an adjudicative proceeding. 
The problem UAC and SITLA have is that they simply do not fit under either 
definition of a ''party". They are not protestants, but SITLA could have been a 
protestant. UAC argues that it did not exist on October 17, 2006, when the subject 
application was filed. That is right, but its co-petitioner SITLA did exist and surely had 
land that would be impacted by the application. SITLA could have easily filed a protest, 
which would have enabled it to be a "party," SITLA would then be authorized to proceed 
in this action. 
UAC still did not exist in July 2010, when the hearings on the CICWCD 
application were held. SITLA did exist and could have belatedly sought to protest in that 
proceeding, ifit had so desired. In addition, UAC did exist as of August 21, 2012, when 
if filed its own application with SITLA, based upon land SITLA owned. As the lessor 
and leasee UAC and SITLA could have belatedly together sought to protest in the subject 
CICWCD application. 
The petitioners did not appear motivated to act until the State Engineer issued his 
ruling converting their application to a fixed period, subordinate to the CICWCD 
-. i 
application. 
The fact of the matter is UAC and SITLA do not fit the definition of a party and 
they did not seek to protest and as such this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The 
motion of the State Engineer should be granted. The petitioners are not entitled to 
judicial review of the CICWCD application. 
II. If somehow UAC and SITLA are '<parties" entitled to judicia] review. have ,. 
they exhausted their administrative remedies? 
Assuming that the Petitioners can somehow overcome their lack of ''party" status, 
they then have to establish that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, before 
they can seek judicial review. Section 630-4-401(2). They claim that the State Engineer 
considered both the CICWCD application and the Petitioners' application together, 
because CICWCD was a protestant of the Petitioners' application and participated in the 
November 2013 hearing on the Petitioners' application. Therefore, they have exhausted 
their remedies and should be allowed to proceed with this judicial review action. 
This case is very similar to the S&G, Inc. v. Morgan, 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) 
case. In S&G the Intermountain Power Agency (hereafter IPA) filed a change 
application for some water rights it was purchasing from S&G. Rather than participate in 
the change application action, S&G chose to do nothing. IP A proceeded to the required 
hearing and the State Engineer took evidence and issued a ruling that S&G did not like. 
By contract IPA was to seek judicial review of that ruling but did not. S&G then 
belatedly tried to obtain a judicial review. The Court ruled that S&G lacked standing to 
.4 
appeal because it had waived its right to participate at the appellate level through its 
intentional inaction at the administrative level. It had not exhausted its administrative 
remedies. 
SITLA is an owner of some of the land subject to the CICWCD water application. 
For some reason, SITLA did not protest or otherwise become involved in the 2006, 
CICWCD application. UAC gets its ability to appropriate water through its lease with 
SITLA. Thus, it is stuck with the land owner's actions. The hearing for the CICWCD 
claim was in July 2010. SITLA appears to have intentionally not participated in the 
CICWCD action before 2010 and it has made no attempt to become involved in it since 
2010. SITLA and UAC relied solely on their own application. 
As in S&G the intentional choice to not participate in or even attempt to intervene 
in another application waives the right to later participate. 
A claim that the Petitioners exhausted their administrative remedies in the 
CICWCD application by taking action in only their own application, defeats the purpose 
of exhausting remedies in the CICWCD application. A party's judicial review right 
arises only in applications where the party fully participates. 
The Petitioners also argue that as proof of their exhaustion of their remedies, the 
court should note the decisions were issued on back to back days, March 13, 2014, and 
March 14, 2014. It might also be noteworthy that the Petitioner's water right is made 
junior to the CICWCD right. All of this is interesting, but not persuasive. The Supreme 
Court in S&G addressed the need for parties to participate at the administrative level as 
follows: 
A requirement of participation at agency level "ensures that those 
who have an interest will bring to the agency's attention all relevant facts 
and considerations at the time the agency makes its decision. Moreover, 
the requirement of [participation] gives the agency and other participants 
notice of the identity and concern of interested parties." ( citation omitted) 
These observations, although made in the context of a statutory requirement 
of party status, are applicable to any administrative decisions in which 
interested parties have the right to participate. The requirement of 
participation as a prerequisite to standing to appeal is a corollary of the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is well settled under 
this doctrine that persons aggrieved by decisions of administrative agencies 
"may not, by refusing or neglecting to submit issues of fact to such 
agencies, by-pass them, and call upon the courts to determine ... matters 
properly determinable originally by such agencies." ( citations omitted) 
S&G. Inc. v. Morgan, 797P.2d at 1087. 
The administrative remedy of intervention is accomplished by seeking to change 
the application from an informal to a formal adjudicative proceeding. Section 630-4-202 
(3) allows that to happen at anytime before a final order is issued. Convetting 
CICWCD's application to a formal proceeding would have been a way for the Petitioners 
to intervene. Section 63G-4-207. Thus, protecting their interest by fully participating in 
the CICWCD action. One can only guess at the outcome, but in theory the State 
Engineer may well have allowed intervention so as to deal with these competing claims 
simultaneously. However, the Petitioners chose not to seek to intervene in the CICWCD 
application. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioners are not parties to the CICWCD application. Without being 
parties, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Petitioners, even if the non-party 
barrier is overcome, chose not to participate in the CICWCD application and to not fully 
exhaust their administrative remedies. Consequently the State Engineers Motion to 
Dismiss is granted. 
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